The Case for Rules in Reasoning by Smith, Edward E. et al.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 16, l-40 (1992) 
The Case for Rules in Reasoning 
EDWARD E. SMITH,~HRISTOPHER LANGSTON 
AND RICHARD E. NISBETT 
Univemify of Mich igun 
A number of theoretic01 positions in psychology-including variants of case-based 
reasoning, instonc&bosed analogy, and connectionist models-maintain that 
abstract rules ore not involved in human reasoning, or at best ploy a minor role. 
Other views hold that the use of abstract rules is o core aspect of human reason- 
ing. We propose eight criteria for determining whether or not people use abstract 
rules in reasoning, ond examine evidence relevant to each criterion for several 
rule systems. We argue thot there is substantial evidence that several different 
inferential rules, including modus ponens, contractual rules, cousai rules, and 
the law of large numbers, ore used in solving everyday problems. We discuss the 
implications for various theoretical positions ond consider hybrid mechanisms 
that combine aspects of instance and rule models. 
One of the oldest views about the nature of thought is that reasoning is 
guided by abstract rules of inference. This view has its origins in Plato’s 
theories of reasoning and education, and was the rationale behind “formal 
discipline” approaches to education ranging from the medieval scholastics’ 
teaching of the syllogism to the English “public school” curriculum of 
Latin and mathematics. In modern times, abstract inferential rules have 
played important roles in some of the most influential theories of cognition, 
including those of Newell and Simon (e.g., 1972) and Piaget and Inhelder 
(e.g., 1958). This blue-blood intellectual history notwithstanding, the role 
of abstract rules has recently come under attack from a variety of sources. 
Part of the attack stems from the development of alternatives to rule- 
based models of thought. One class of alternatives is instance models, which 
assume that solving a problem involves the retrieval of specific instances 
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from memory, one or more of which is then used as an analog for the cur- 
rent problem. Sophisticated instance models were first developed in the 
study of categorization, and the key ideas of the approach have been ex- 
tended to reasoning (see Medin & Ross, 1989, for a review). Thus, numerous 
researchers contend that deductive reasoning is more a matter of retrieving 
examples than of applying rules (e.g., Griggs & Cox, 1982; Manktelow & 
Evans, 1979; Reich & Ruth, 1982). A related development in artificial intel- 
ligence is the emergence of case-based reasoning models. These models 
assume that knowledge about a topic is partly represented by particular 
cases, which are stored with a relevant generalization, and which figure 
centrally in reasoning processes (e.g., Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1982). Still 
another theoretical development that eschews rules is connectionism. Con- 
nectionist models contain only simple processing units, each of which sends 
excitatory and inhibitory signals to other units, with nothing like a rule in 
sight. Yet these neural-like models can often produce the same behavior as 
rule models (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986). 
In addition to the challenge of rival models, the rule-based approach to 
reasoning is at odds with certain broad intellectual movements that affect 
psychology. One is the evolutionary approach to behavior, which holds that 
much of cognition may be attributable to specific mechanisms rather than 
to general purpose ones like applying abstract inferential rules (e.g., Buss, 
1991). Along different iines, the heuristic approach to choice and decision 
making that is gaining strength in decision theory and economics contends 
that people lack the rules necessary for normatively correct reasoning, such 
as the base-rate and regression principles (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1986). Work in this 
tradition shows, for example, that people often substitute judgments about 
similarity for normatively required rule-based reasoning. Although these 
broad trends lack the “bite” of alternative models, they have contributed to 
the tarnishing of the rule-based approach to reasoning. 
The case for abstract rules, then, appears debatable. In this article, we 
try to give some direction to the debate. We propose eight criteria for decid- 
ing whether a given abstract rule is applied, where each criterion essentially 
embodies a phenomenon that is more readily explained by a rule-based 
approach than by an alternative model. We argue that use of these criteria 
indicates there is substantial evidence for people’s use of several deductive 
and inductive inferential rules, all of which have in common that they are 
widely considered to be normatively required for correct reasoning. 
TWO CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES ABOUT RULE FOLLOWING 
Abstraction and Application 
To appreciate what is involved in the debate about rules, we need to say 
what it means to claim that a person is following a rule. Note first that our 
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interest is in a person following a rule, not in a person’s behavior merely 
conforming to a rule. When we fall down, for example, our behavior con- 
forms to certain rules of physics, but no one would want to claim that we 
are actually following these rules. For rule following to occur, there must be 
a correspondence between the rule and a mental event; indeed, there should 
be a one-to-one correspondence between the symbols of the rule and the 
components of a mental event (Pylyshyn, 1990). 
As a paradigm case of following an abstract rule, consider the situation 
where a reasoner is presented with the statements, “If Abner is over 18, 
then he can vote; Abner is over 18,” and tries to determine what follows 
from these statements by using the propositional logic rule modusponens- 
If p then q; p; therefore q (quotation marks indicate specific statements, 
italics indicate rules.) To say that the reasoner “follows” or “uses” modus 
ponens requires that the reasoner: 
1. Recognize that the input is of a certain abstract kind (the input is of the 
form If p then q;), and as a consequence it is subsumed by a certain rule 
(modus ponens); and 
2. Applies the rule to the input (instantiates up then q with “If Abner is 
over I8 then he can vote;“, p with “Abner is over 18,” and concludes 
q, that “Abner can vote”). 
Step 1 establishes that the input can be coded as an instantiation of an 
abstraction. Step 2 establishes that the rule itseif is applied; that is, variables 
stated in the rule (p and q) are instantiated with constants from the input 
(such as, “Abner is over 18’7, and then another process inspects this instanti- 
ated representation and draws the appropriate conclusions. Some opponents 
of rules have taken issue with the claim about abstraction, whereas others 
are troubled by the claims about applying a rule. 
Consider first the abstraction issue. A code or representation can be 
abstract in several different senses. It can 
. contain relatively few meaning components (this is the sense in which 
color is more abstract than red), 
. contain variables (such as p and q in modus ponens), 
l have a high degree of generality, 
. be relatively nonperceptual. 
The four meanings are clearly interrelated. In particular, a rule that contains 
variables must contain relatively few meaning components (because the 
variables have replaced some components), and must have some degree of 
generality (because the variables range over certain values). In this article, 
we generally use the term absfract to mean confains variables, with the other 
three meanings typically being implied as well (exceptions to this usage will 
be explicitly noted). 
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Given this interpretation of abstraction, we note that many of those who 
favor instance models, and some who champion case-based models (e.g., 
Lewis, 1988), object to the claim that inputs are coded and processed as in- 
stantiations of abstract structures. They would not, for example, believe that 
our miniproblem about Abner is ever coded in terms of anything as abstract 
as modus ponens. And if the problem is not coded abstractly, it cannot be 
assimilated to an abstract rule. Hence, the contrast between rules on the one 
hand versus instances and cases on the other, comes down, in large part, to 
the question of how abstractly we represent problems (see Barsalou, 1990). 
We can further illustrate this contrast with a task that has been widely 
used in reasoning research and that will figure prominently in this article, 
Wason’s (1966) four-card problem (also known as the “selection” task). In 
the standard version of the problem, four cards are laid out displaying the 
symbols “E,” “K, ” “4,” and “7.” Each card has a letter on one side and a 
number on the other. The task is to determine which of these cards needs to 
be turned over to determine the truth or falsity of the hypothesis: “If a card 
has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other.” In another 
version of the problem, the four cards read “beer,” “coke,” “22,” and 
“16,” and the hypothesis to be tested is: “If a person is drinking beer, s/he 
must be over 18.” Though the two versions are formally identical, people 
do much better on the drinking version than on the standard version. (The 
correct answers are “E” and “7” in the standard version, and “beer” and 
“16”’ in the drinking version.) According to proponents of abstract rules, 
people solve the four-card problem by applying rules that, though less gen- 
eral than propositional logic rules, still are general enough to cover various 
kinds of relations; in this case, the rules concern the relations involved in 
permission. Because rules concerned with permission are likely to apply to 
drinking but not to alphanumeric symbols, people do better on the drinking 
version than on the standard version of the problem (Cheng & Holyoak, 
1985). In contrast, according to the proponents of instance models, people 
solve the four-card problem by retrieving from memory either specific epi- 
sodes or domain-specific rules (like rules about drinking in particular bars: 
that are applicable to the problem. The drinking version of the problem ia 
likely to retrieve either a domain-specific rule that is applicable to the cur. 
rent problem or a specific episode that can be analogized to the curren 
problem, whereas the standard version is not likely to do so. That is why the 
drinking version leads to better performance (Griggs, 1983; Manktelow A 
Evans, 1979). 
Unlike instance models, connectionist models are not hostile to the notion 
of stored abstractions per se. Some connectionist models (e.g., Hinton 6 
Sejnowski, 1984) include units that represent entities like animate am 
metallic, which are abstract in the senses of containing few meaning compo 
nents, being very general, and being relatively nonperceptual. Other connec 
tionist models embrace abstractions in that they deal with the representation 
RULES IN REASONING 5 
of variables and variable binding (e.g., Smolensky, 1988). However, connec- 
ionist models are incompatible with the claims that a rule can be represented 
explicitly as a separate structure, and that this structure is inspected by 
distinct processes. This seems to be the most widely held interpretation of 
rule following, and it is the one we will pursue for most of this article. 
Thus, the two major issues that fuel the antirule movement concern how 
abstractly we represent problems, and whether we process explicitly repre- 
sented rules. At this time, there is comparatively little empirical data on 
reasoning that can be brought to bear on the rule-application issue. The 
abstraction issue is a different story; in this case there is a large body of rele- 
vant data on reasoning. The bulk of this article is concerned with these data, 
in particular with determining how well the data line up with a set of proposed 
criteria that can be used to distinguish abstract representations from concrete, 
specific ones. In the final section we return to the rule-application issue. 
Need for Criteria in Dealing With the Debate 
Many researchers would agree that people can reason both ways: by apply- 
ing abstract rules and by analogizing to stored instances. But to go beyond 
this bland and uninformative generalization we need to know how to deter- 
mine when people reason in each way. That is, we need agreement about 
what counts as evidence for abstract-rule use and what counts as evidence 
for instance use. In this article we will propose eight such criteria and apply 
them to proposals about rule systems in deductive and inductive reasoning. 
We claim that the criteria taken together will often suffice to resolve con- 
troversy about a given case of reasoning concerning whether abstract rules 
are or are not being used. Furthermore, we will argue that the existing evi- 
dence concerning these criteria establishes that people often use abstract 
rules when reasoning about everyday problems. Before considering the 
criteria, however, several constraints on the scope of the discussion and 
several ground rules need to be spelled out. 
First, we are concerned with the use of rules in reasoning (i.e., evalu- 
ating a hypothesis in light of evidence). Many arguments have already been 
advanced for the use of abstract rules in language comprehension and pro- 
duction (e.g., Chomsky, 1985; Pinker & Prince, 1988), but in view of the 
possibility that language may be a special skill, we cannot generalize this 
evidence to the case of reasoning. 
Another constraint is that, within the realm of reasoning, we are con- 
cerned with inferential rules, which, by definition, apply to multiple content 
domains (where content domains are different areas of knowledge that have 
specific properties, areas like chess or physics or adult social relations). Rules 
at this level include logical rules, rules for causal deduction dealing with 
necessity and sufficiency, contractual rules including rules for permission 
and obligation, statistical rules such as the law of large numbers, and deci- 
sion rules such as cost-benefit rules. They are to be distinguished from 
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empirical rules, no matter how general that describe events in some content 
domain. Inferential rules are also to be distinguished from operating princi- 
ples (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986), which are immutable 
principles that work automatically in running the cognitive system. An 
example is the similarity principle, which holds that objects sharing known 
properties tend to share unknown ones as well. This principle plays a sub- 
stantial role in reasoning but it is not clear that use of the principle involves 
following an explicit rule (for contrasting views on this, though, see Collins 
& Michalski, 1989; Smith, Lopez, 8c Osherson, in press). Throughout the 
rest of this article, when we refer to “abstract rules” we mean “abstract 
inferential rules .” 
A related constraint is that most of the abstract rules of interest are, in 
some sense, natural ones. We have in mind the kind of rule that could be 
induced by any cognitively mature human given normal experience with the 
environment. That is, exemplars of the rule are plentiful in everyday experi- 
ence, and inducing the rule from these exemplars would require neither 
excessive demands on any relevant processing mechanism (e.g., short-term 
memory) nor coding of events in ways that are uncongenial (e.g., disjunc- 
tions, as in “a red circle or a loud tone”). Furthermore, natural rules are 
such that they lead to many pragmatically useful inferences. We realize that 
all this does not amount to a definition, but we take comfort in the fact that 
the notion of a natural rule, or the related notion of a natural concept, has 
proven exceptionally difficult to characterize formally (see, e.g., Goodman, 
1955; Murphy & Medin, 1985). 
Another ground rule is that we do not assume that there is always con- 
scious awareness of the use of inferential rules. Some inferential rules may 
be applied only unconsciously (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Others may be 
applied some of the time with a concomitant recognition that the rule is 
being used. 
In our discussion, we will make no attempt to distinguish a specific in- 
stance (“Abner being told that he must be over 21 to drink at Joe’s Bar”) 
from an instance-specific rule (UAbner wants to drink at Joe’s bar, he must 
be over 21). We neglect this distinction in part because our concern for most 
of this article is with the abstraction issue, not the rule-application issue, 
and in part because it is not clear what empirical evidence could be brought 
to bear on the distinction. 
Our final ground rule concerns the criteria themselves. We do not believe 
that any single criterion provides iron-clad evidence for the use of an abstract 
rule (nor does negative evidence for a single criterion establish that the rule 
does not operate). Rather, it is the use of multiple criteria in converging 
operations that can make a strong case for or against the use of a particular 
rule. We also make no claim that the criteria are exhaustive of those that 
would provide evidence for or against the assertion that an abstract rule is 
used for some task. They exhaust only our knowledge of criteria that actually 
have been examined. 
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EVIDENCE FOR CRITERIA OF RULE FOLLOWING 
1x1 this section we will defend the use of eight different criteria for establishing 
whether reasoning makes use of abstract rules and apply each criterion to 
relevant evidence. Three of the criteria derive from psycholinguistics, where 
more than in any other area an effort has been made to establish that behav- 
ior is based on rule following. Three of the other criteria involve the perfor- 
mance measures of speed, accuracy, and verbal report that are routinely 
used by experimental psychologists to examine cognitive processes. The re- 
maining two criteria make use of training procedures to establish that highly 
general rules can be “inserted” by abstract training methods. We list the 
criteria, and then present a rationale for each of them and a discussion of its 
use to date. 




Criteria Stemming from Linguistics 
Performance on rule-governed items is as accurate with unfamiliar as 
with familiar material. 
Performance on rule-governed items is as accurate with abstract as with 
concrete material. 





Performance on a rule-governed item or problem deteriorates as a func- 
tion of the number of rules that are required for solving the problem. 
Performance on a rule-governed item is facilitated when preceded by 
another item based on the same rule (application of a rule primes its 
subsequent use). 




Performance on a specific rule-governed problem is improved by train- 
ing on abstract versions of the rule. 
Performance on problems in a particular domain is improved as much 
by training on problems outside the domain as on problems within it, as 
long as the problems are based on the same rule. 
We note in advance that the criteria vary among themselves with respect to 
the strength of evidence they provide for rule use. This variation will become 
evident as we discuss the criteria. We note further that the criteria also vary 
with respect to how many different abstract rules they have been applied to. 
Consequently, for some criteria, such as Criterion 1, we will consider numer- 
ous rules, whereas for other criteria we will discuss but a single rule. 
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Criterion 1: Performance on Rule-Governed Items 
Is as Accurate with Unfamiliar as with Familiar Items 
Rationale. The logic behind Criterion 1 stems from the idea that an 
abstract rule is applicable to a specific item because the item can be repre- 
sented by some special abstract strucrure that also defines the rule (the 
special structure is the antecedent part of the rule). Because even novel items 
can possess this special structure, they can be assimilated to the rule (see 
Rips, 1990). Consider the phonological rules for forming plurals of English 
nouns. One of the rules is (roughly) of the form, uthe finalphoneme of a 
singular noun is voiced, then add the phoneme lzl to it. This rule identifies 
the special structure, singular noun whose final phoneme is voiced, and any 
noun-familiar, unfamiliar, or nonsense -that can be represented by this 
structure can be assimilated to the rule. This is why the fact that any English 
speaker can tell you the plural of the nonsense item “zig” is “zigz” (as in 
“cows”) has been taken by many psycholinguists as evidence that people do 
indeed possess the phonological rule in question (e.g., Berko, 1958). 
To see how this criterion can be applied to reasoning rules, consider again 
modus ponens (up then q;p; therefore q). Clearly, this rule can be applied 
to novel items, even nonsense ones. If someone tells you that “If gork then 
flum, and gork is the case,” you no doubt will conclude that “flum” 
follows. To the extent you can draw this conclusion as readily as you can 
with familiar material, the rule should be attributed to your repertoire. 
To make the argument for rule following even stronger, it is useful to 
consider a sketch of a prototypical rule model (which is just an amplifica- 
tion of our previous comments about rule following): 
When a test item or problem is presented, it is coded in a form that is suffi- 
ciently abstract to lead to access of an abstract rule: Once accessed, if need be, 
the rule can be used for further abstract coding of the test item. The next stage 
is to instantiate, or bind, the variables in the rule with entities from the input. 
Finally, the rule is applied to yield the desired answer; that is, inspection of the 
instantiated representation reveals that the antecedent of the rule has been 
satisfied, thereby licensing the conclusion. There are therefore four stages: 
coding, access, instantiation (variable binding), and application. 
We can illustrate the model with our “If gork then flum; gork; ?” example. 
When presented with this item, you might code it, in part, as an “If X, then 
Y” type item. This would suffice to access modus ponens. Next, you would 
instantiate p with “gork” and q with “flum.” Then you would apply the 
rule and derive “flum” as an answer. Note that had you initially coded the 
item more superficially-say, as an “If-then claim”-this might still have 
sufficed to activate modus ponens, which could then have been used to 
elaborate the abstract coding. Though this is merely a sketch of a model, it 
is compatible with the general structure of rule-based models of deductive 
and inductive reasoning (e.g., Collins & Michalski, 1989; Rips, 1983). 
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With this sketch in hand we can be more explicit about how our criterion 
of equivalent accuracy for familiar and unfamiliar items fits with rule- 
following. If we assume that there is no effect of familiarity on the likeli- 
hood of coding an item sufficiently abstractly, then there will be no effect of 
familiarity on the likelihood of accessing an abstract rule. Similarly, if we 
assume there is no effect of familiarity on instantiating a rule or inspecting 
an instantiated representation, there will be no effect of familiarity on apply- 
ing a rule. Both assumptions seem plausible, which makes the criterion 
plausible (i.e., familiar items should not lead to greater accuracy). Indeed, 
if anything, the more familiar an item is, the fess likely it is to be coded 
abstractly. This is because familiarity often rests on frequency, and frequent 
presentations of an item might lead one to represent it in terms of its specific 
content. 
For a criterion to be truly useful, of course, the phenomenon it describes 
must also be difficult to account for by a nonrule-based explanation. The 
major alternatives to rule models are instance models, and Criterion 1 is 
indeed hard to expIain in terms of instances. To appreciate this point, con- 
sider a rough sketch of a prototypical instance model: 
When a test item or problem is presented, it is first coded, and this representa- 
tion serves to activate stored instances from memory. The basis for access is 
the similarity of the test item and stored instances. One or more of the stored 
instances then serve as an analog for the test item. More specifically, a mapping 
is made between certain aspects of the retrieved instance and known aspects of 
the test item; this mapping then licenses the transfer of other aspects of the 
retrieved instance to unknown aspects of the test item. There are, therefore, 
three major stages: coding, access, and mapping. 
This sketch of a model captures the general structure of current analogy 
models (e.g., Gentner, 1983; Holyoak, 1984; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). In 
applying the sketch to the phenomenon captured by Criterion 1, two critical 
questions arise. The first is whether the representation of an instance codes 
the special structure of the rule, or is instead restricted to more concrete 
information. To illustrate, suppose you have stored an instance of the state- 
ment, “If you drive a motorcycle in Michigan, then you must be over 17”; 
the question of interest amounts to whether your stored instance includes 
information equivalent to up implies q;p; therefore q. If an instance repre- 
sentation does include such information, then it essentially includes the 
rule. This strikes us not only as implausible, but also as contrary to the in- 
tended meaning of (‘instance.” In particular, one does not think of an 
instance as containing variables. In what follows, then, we will assume that 
instances do not encode the abstraction they instantiate, though often they 
may encode features that are correlated with the abstraction. Thus, instance 
models differ from rule models not just in whether the test item accesses an 
instance or a rule, but also in how abstractly the test item is coded to begin 
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with. (A possible exception to this principle arises when people are explicitly 
encouraged to process the instances deeply. In experimental situations like 
this, there is evidence that abstractions are indeed coded, though the abstrac- 
tions that have been studied are different from the inferential rules that we 
discuss; see Hammond, Seifert, & Gray, 1991). 
The second critical question for an instance model is how to compute the 
similarity between the test item and the stored instance. If the similarity is 
computed over all features, then the model cannot explain the phenomenon 
of equal accuracy for familiar and unfamiliar items, because there is no 
guarantee that the stored instances most similar to “gork implies flum” will 
be useful in dealing with the test item. Perhaps “glory and fame” will be 
retrieved, and this conjunction is of no use in dealing with the test item. A 
comparable story holds for our phonological example. If overall similarity 
is what matters, “zig” may retrieve “zip” from memory, and the latter’s 
plural will not work for the test item. 
To salvage an instance model we must assume that the similarity between 
the test item and stored instance is computed over very restricted features, 
namely, those correlated with the special structure of the rule. Consider 
again a stored instance of the regulation, “If you drive a motorcycle in 
Michigan, then you must be over 17.” The representation of this instance 
may well contain features corresponding to the concepts if and then, where 
these features are correlated with modus ponens. If such features were given 
great weight in the similarity calculation, a useful analog might be retrieved. 
There are, however, three problems with the assumption of differential 
weighting. First, it is ad hoc. Second, it may be wrong, as a growing body of 
evidence indicates that the retrieval of analogs is influenced more by con- 
crete features, like appearance and taxonomic category, than abstract ones 
(e.g., Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Ross, 1987). Third, 
for some rules there may be no obvious features correlated with the rule’s 
special structure (a good example is the law of large numbers, as we will see 
later). In short, when it comes to explaining the phenomenon that accuracy 
is as high for novel rule-based items as for familiar ones, an instance model 
seems to be either wrong or ad hoc. As we will see, the same conclusion 
holds for many of the other phenomena we consider. 
Evidence kbout Modus Ponens 
Criterion 1 supports the hypothesis that people use modus ponens. Our “if 
gork then flum” example suggests that we can perform extremely well on 
unfamiliar rule-based items. 
Surprisingly, we have had difficulty locating a published experimental 
report that permits a comparison between performance with familiar and 
unfamiliar instances of modus ponens. Perhaps the closest to the mark is a 
study by Byrne (1989, Experiment 1). In this study, subjects were given 
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statements of the form, up then q andp, and had to decide which of three 
possible conclusions was correct, one of them of course being q. Subjects’ 
performance- which was extremely close to perfect-showed no difference 
between the very familiar item, “If it is raining, then we’ll get wet. It is rain- 
ing. ?“, and the seemingly less familiar item, “If she meets her friend, then 
she will go to a play. She meets her friend. ?” For these data, modus ponens 
passes Criterion 1. 
Evidence About Modus Tollens. Modus tollens is a rule in propositional 
logic that states, up then q; not q; therefore not p. Unlike modus ponens, 
subjects seem to have more difficulty in applying modus tollens to unfamiliar 
than to familiar items. Some critical evidence comes from a study by Cheng 
and Holyoak (1985), which used the four-card problem described earlier. 
Recall that in this paradigm subjects decide which of four cases must be 
checked to determine the truth or falsity of a hypothesis. Cheng and Holy- 
oak used the hypothesis, “If a letter is sealed, then it must carry a 20-cent 
stamp,” along with four cards corresponding to “sealed,” “unsealed,” 
“20-cent,” and “lo-cent.” Note that the hypothesis has (part of) the special 
structure of modus tollens with the “lo-cent” card instantiating the role of 
not q. Cheng and Holyoak presented the hypothesis and choices to two 
groups of subjects, with one group being familiar with the hypothesized 
regulation and the other group not being familiar with the regulation. There 
were more choices of the not q card in the group familiar with the hypothe- 
sized regulation than in the group that was not. Hence, modus tollens fails 
Criterion 1, suggesting that it is not a rule that most people naturally follow. 
Evidence About Contractual Rules. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) and their 
colleagues (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986) proposed that people 
have sets of abstract rules (often referred to as “schemas”) that characterize 
contractual relations of various types. Thus, people have a set of abstract 
permission rules, which they use to understand that a certain action may be 
carried out only when a precondition of some kind is established. The per- 
mission rules include: 
1. If action A is taken, precondition P must be satisfied. 
2. If action A is not taken, precondition P need not be satisfied. 
3. If precondition P is satisfied, action A can be taken. 
4. If precondition P is not satisfied, action A must not be taken. 
Note that this set of rules carries with it an indication of the checking proce- 
dures necessary to establish whether a permission contract has been violated: 
Examine cases where an action has been carried out (to establish that the 
precondition obtained, Rule l), and cases where the precondition does not 
obtain (to establish that the action was not carried out, Rule 4). Presumably 
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people also have a set of abstract obligation rules, which they use to under- 
stand that when a certain precondition obtains, a particular action must be 
carried out. The rules include: 
1.’ If precondition P is satisfied, action A must be taken. 
2.’ If precondition P is not satisfied, action A may be taken. 
3.’ If action A is taken, precondition P may or may not be satisfied. 
4.’ If action A is not taken, precondition P must not be satisfied. 
Again, the rules specify checking procedures to establish whether violations 
of an obligation contract has occurred (see Rules 1 ’ and 4 ‘). 
The major line of evidence establishing that people use such abstract 
rules comes from studies using the four-card problem. One important find- 
ing is that as long as the hypothesis being tested can be assimilated to the 
permission rules, the familiarity of the hypothesis has no effect on perfor- 
mance. For example, Cheng et al. (1986) presented subjects with the rela- 
tively unfamiliar hypothesis, “If a passenger wishes to enter the country, 
then he or she must have had an inoculation against cholera,” along with 
the choices “entering,” “not entering,” “inoculated,” and “not inocu- 
lated”; subjects were also presented irvith the relatively familiar hypothesis, 
“If a customer is drinking an alcoholic beverage, then he or she must be 
over 21,” along with the choices “drinking,” “not drinking,” “over 21,” 
and “under 21.” Subjects performed as well with the unfamiliar hypothesis 
as the familiar one. Subjects correctly identified which cases must be checked 
(“entering,” “not inoculated,” “drinking,” “under 21”) and avoided 
checking the other cases that could not establish a violation of the hypothe- 
sis, and did so to the same extent whether the rule was familiar or not. (Note 
that selecting “not inoculated” or “under 18” counts as evidence for a per- 
mission rule but not for modus tollens, because other items that fit modus 
tollens but not the permission rule were handled poorly.) 
There is similar evidence for the use of obligation rules. Again using the 
four-card problem, Cheng et al. (1986) presented subjects with relatively 
unfamiliar hypothesis that could be assimiliated to the obligation rules, 
such as, “If one works for the armed forces, then one must vote in the elec- 
tions,” along with choices like “armed forces,” “not armed forces,” 
“vote,” and “not vote.” They also presented subjects with somewhat more 
familiar hypotheses that could be assimilated to obligation, such as “If any 
miner gets lung cancer, then the company will pay the miner a sickness pen- 
sion,” along with choices like “lung cancer,” “not lung cancer,” “pension,” 
and “no pension.” Again, subjects performed as well with the unfamiliar 
hypothesis as with the familiar one. 
The evidence just cited has some weaknesses. There was no independent 
check on the variation in familiarity, and very few items were used. Still, the 
evidence is suggestive. Furthermore, as noted earlier, it is difficult to con- 
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struct an account of these results in terms of an instance model. Such an 
account has to explain why it is that whatever instances are dredged up from 
memory by the intersection of events like “entering a country” and “having 
an inoculation” are just as likely to key the appropriate checking pro- 
cedures as the direct memory of actual cases of drinking though less than 21 
years old, not being able to drink because of being less than 21 years old, 
and so on. 
Evidence About Causal Rules 
Morris, Cheng, and Nisbett (1991) have investigated a version of Kelley’s 
(1972) causal schema theory. Kelley’s theory assumes that people have dif- 
ferent rule sets (often referred to as “schemas”) for causal situations that 
differ with respect to the necessity and sufficiency of the causes involved. 
For example, people understand that some types of causes are both neces- 
sary and sufficient (e.g., 100°C temperature causes water to boil); some 
types are necessary but not sufficient (exposure to the Hong Kong flu virus, 
together with other preconditions, causes Hong Kong flu); some types are 
sufficient but not necessary (lack of fuel, among other factors, causes a 
car to be inoperable); and some types are neither necessary nor sufficient 
(smoking, together with other preconditions, and among other factors, 
causes lung cancer). 
Using the four-card problem and related paradigm, Morris et al. (1991) 
provided evidence that people follow such causal rules. They showed that 
subjects usually performed appropriate checking procedures to establish 
whether a given case could overturn a particular causal hypothesis. More- 
over, this was true even when the hypothesis was an unfamiliar one, involv- 
ing entities never encountered before by the subjects. For example, for the 
hypothesis, “Temperature above 1500°C causes the element Floridium to 
turn into a gas,” most subjects understood that all four possible events 
(“temperature above 1500 “C, ” “temperature below 15OO”C,” “Floridium 
in gaseous form, ” “Floridium in liquid form”) should be checked in order 
to see whether the hypothesis was overturned. If we focus on the data from 
the more sophisticated subjects (advanced graduate students), more than 
70% of their tests of unfamiliar hypotheses were completely correct, whereas 
only 6% of the tests would be expected to be compIetely correct by chance 
alone. Although the study lacks a comparison with the testing of familiar 
hypotheses, the obtained level of performance is sufficiently high to suggest 
that subjects (particularly sophisticated ones) were using the rules. 
Evidence About the Law of Large Numbers. Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, 
and Kunda (1983) argued that people have an intuitive appreciation of the 
law of large numbers and an ability to apply it to real-world situations. The 
central notion in the law of large numbers is that sample parameters approach 
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population parameters as a direct function of the number of cases in the 
sample, and as an inverse function of the degree of variability associated 
with the parameter. In the limiting case of no variability for the parameter, 
a sample of one case is adequate for an induction to the population value. 
To show that people appreciate these notions as an abstract rule, bhsbett 
et al. (1983) asked subjects to imagine that they were visitors to a South 
Pacific island who were being introduced to a range of local phenomena 
they had never seen before. They were to imagine that they saw an unusual 
bird called a “shreeble,” which was blue in color, and asked to estimate 
what percent of shreebles on the island were blue. Other subjects were asked 
the same question after being told to imagine they had seen either 3 or 20 
shreebles, all of which were blue. Subjects’ estimates were systematically 
affected by the number of cases. They believed that a higher fraction of 
shreebles were blue when examining 20 cases than when examining 3 cases, 
and believed that a higher fraction were blue when examining 3 cases than 1 
case. In contrast, the number of cases did not affect the percentage estimates 
when the entities in question were members of the “Barratos” tribe and the 
parameter was skin color. (The modal estimated percentage to the skin-color 
question was lOO%, even with only one case.) This pattern of findings is 
consistent ,with subjects’ reports of their assumptions about variability, as 
they generally assumed that bird kinds are variable with respect to color, 
whereas isolated tribes are uniform with respect to color. Again, we see a 
high level of performance with relatively unfamiliar material, so high as to 
suggest the use of rules even though the study lacks an explicit comparison 
with familiar material. 
Finally, it should be noted that it is difficult to explain the high level of 
performance by direct application of an instance model. Presumably, such 
a model would assume that, when told about shreebles, subjects retrieve 
similar instances, some particular tropical birds, for example, examine their 
variability with respect to color, and qualify their generalizations as a func- 
tion of the presumed variability. This still leaves unexplained, however, why 
subjects recognize that they have to qualify generalizations more for small 
samples than for large ones. And it is extremely unlikely that subjects 
retrieve a prior problem that they had solved by applying the law of large 
numbers, because there are no obvious features of the shreeble problem that 
are correlated with that rule. 
Criterion 2: Performance with Rule-Governed Items is as Accurate 
with Abstract as With Concrete Materials 
Rationale. This criterion is similar to our first one. However, whereas 
Criterion 1 was concerned with unfamiliar or nonsensical items, Criterion 2 
is concerned with abstract items that may in fact be very familiar. To appre- 
ciate Criterion 2, note that intuition suggests that the rule modus ponens 
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can readily be applied to a totally abstract item, such as “If A then B; A; 
therefore B.” (This item is abstract in the sense of containing few features, 
and, possibly, in the sense of containing variables.) Good performance on 
this item fits with the sketch of a rule model we presented earlier, because 
there is no reason to expect that abstract items are less likely than concrete 
ones to access the modus ponens rule, and no reason to expect abstract 
items to fare less well than concrete ones in instantiating the rule or inspect- 
ing an instantiated representation. If anything, we might expect abstract 
items to be both more likely to access the rule and easier to instantiate, 
because abstract items are more similar to the rule than are concrete items. 
Note further that good performance on abstract items is quite difficult to 
explain in terms of an instance model, because the only thing that an abstract 
item and a retrieved instance can possibly have in common is the speciaI 
structure of the rule. That is, the use of abstract items allows one to strip 
away all content but the special structure, and consequently, performance 
must be based on the special structure alone (Rips, 1990). For these reasons, 
Criterion 2 is among the most diagnostic ones we will consider. 
Evidence About Modus Ponens 
As for Criterion 1, intuitive evidence alone makes it plausible that modus 
ponens passes Criterion 2. But it is worth considering some experimental 
results. Evans (1977) presented each of 16 subjects four modus ponens prob- 
lems of the following abstract sort: 
If the letter is L, then the number is 5 
The letter is L 
Therefore the number is 5. 
The task was to decide whether the conclusion (the statement below the line) 
was valid or invalid. Performance was perfect: all 16 subjects got all four 
questions right. Modus ponens passes Criterion 2 with flying colors. 
Evidence About Modus Tollens. Comparable research shows poor per- 
formance on modus tollens using abstract material. This was the striking 
finding of the classic Wason (1966) article that introduced the four-card 
problem. Given cards labeled “A,” “B,” “4,” and “7,” and asked to turn 
over enough cards to test the hypothesis, “If there is an A on the front, then 
there is a 4 on the back,” even highly intelligence subjects rarely turn over 
the “7” card (finding an “A” on the other side would establish the falsity 
of the hypothesis). This is the chief evidence against people using modus 
tollens. 
We note in passing that this sort of negative evidence was overgeneralized 
by many to become evidence against formal rule systems in general, and is 
another component in the current popularity of instance models. The studies 
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on contractual and causal schemas by Cheng and her colleagues amount to 
a demonstration that there has been such an overgeneralization. Subjects 
solve problems that are syntactically identical to the Wason four-card prob- 
lem so long as the content of the problem suggests a contractual or causal 
interpretation allowing an appropriate, abstract rule to be applied. 
Evidence About Contractual Rules. Some of Cheng’s work just alluded 
to shows good performance on the permission rule using abstract materials. 
In the four-card problem, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) presented subjects 
with the hypothesis, “If one is to take action A, then one must first satisfy 
precondition P,” along with choices like “A,” “not A,” “P,” and “not P.” 
Performance on this abstract problem (61% correct) far exceeded perfor- 
mance on a control problem (“If a card has an A on one side, it must have a 
4 on the other”) that could not be assimilated to the permission rule (19% 
correct). Although the study lacked a direct comparison with concrete 
materials, the level of performance was sufficiently high to suggest the use 
of a rule. (See, also, Cheng & Holyoak’s 1989 study of an abstract pre- 
caution rule.) 
Evidence About Causal Rules. Morris et al. (1991) provided some evidence 
that people can accurately apply causal rules to purely abstract material. 
They presented subjects with causal hypotheses that were qualified with 
respect to necessity and sufficiency, and asked subjects to indicate whether 
particular states of affairs could overturn the hypotheses. For example, sub- 
jects were told that a scientist believes that “Event A causes event B,” and 
further believes that “The occurrence of event A is the only cause of event 
B, and that event A only sometimes causes event B.” When presented with 
possible patterns of events-namely, “A and B,” “A and not B,” “not A 
and B,” and “not A and not B” -subjects were highly accurate in selecting 
those patterns that could refute the hypotheses (“not A and B”). Further- 
more, a change in the causal hypothesis-say, “A causes B, but A is not the 
only cause of B, and A always causes B” -led to marked changes in the 
subjects’ choice of a refuting pattern (“A and not B”). Although the study 
again lacked an explicit comparison to concrete materials, the high 1eveI of 
performance seems difficult to account for by an instance model: Over 60% 
of the tests of abstract hypotheses were completely correct, whereas the per- 
centage expected by chance is only 6%. 
Criterion 3: Early in Acquisition, A Rule May be Applied 
to an Exception (A Rule is Overextended) 
Rationale. In psycholinguistics, this criterion has figured prominently in 
studies of how children master the regular past-tense form of English verbs. 
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The relevant rule is to add “ed” to the stem of verbs to form the past tense, 
such as “cook-cooked.” A finding that has been taken as evidence for 
following this rule is the tendency of young children to overextend the rule 
to irregular forms, such as “go-goed,” even though they had previously 
used the irregular form correctly (Ervin, 1964). The rule specifies a special 
structure- the stem of a verb-and the phenomenon arises because children 
apply the rule to items containing the special structure even though the 
items should have been marked as exceptions. In terms of our sketch of a 
rule model, early in acquisition, exceptional verbs are likely to be repre- 
sented in a way that accesses the relevant rule, and once the rule is accessed 
it is instantiated and applied. 
Perhaps for more than any other criterion, there has been a concerted 
effort to formulate nonrule-based accounts of overextension. Thus, Rumel- 
hart and McClelland (1987) offered a connectionist account of the overex- 
tension of the past-tense “rule,” and others offered instance-based accounts 
of apparent overextensions of classification rules (see, e.g., Medin & Smith, 
1981). In general, then, this criterion seems less diagnostic than the previous 
two we considered. We include it, though, because it may prove to be diag- 
nostic in specific cases. Indeed, with regard to overextension of the past- 
tense rule, critiques of the Rumelhart and McClelland proposal by Pinker 
and Prince (1988) and Marcus et al. (1990) suggest that a rule-based theory 
stir1 provides the fullest account of the data. The critics noted, for example, 
that children are no more likely to overgeneralize an irregular verb that is 
similar to many regular ones than to overgeneralize an irregular verb that is 
similar to few regular ones. Yet, in most connectionist models, as in instance 
models, generalization is based on similarity. The lack of similarity effects 
fits perfectly with a rule-based account, of course. Thus, in situations where 
the likelihood of overgeneralizing an exception does not depend on the 
similarity of the exception to the regular cases, the criterion is indeed 
diagnostic. 
Evidence About the Law of Large Numbers. The overextension criterion 
has rarely been applied to abstract rules. An exception is the law of large 
numbers. Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986) trained subjects on this rule, 
and found they sometimes applied it to cases where it was inappropriate. 
For example, in one problem presented after training, subjects were told 
about a basketball talent scout who watched a particular prospect through 
two games and concluded that he had excelIent skills but a tendency to mis- 
play under extreme pressure. The former inference was based on nearly 2 
hours of play, the latter on a single episode. Trained subjects were more 
likely than controls to assert correctly that the “pressure” doagnisis was 
based on too little evidence, but were also more likely to assert incorrectly 
that the global judgment of excellent skills was similarly based on too little 
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evidence. Thus, trained subjects sometimes overextended the rule to cases 
where it was not appropriate. The fact that this kind of overextension oc- 
curred lends credibility to the claim that a rule corresponding to the law of 
large numbers was indeed being followed, especially because virtually no 
control (untrained) subjects expressed the view that a larger sample would 
have been helpful in assessing the prospect’s skills. 
An instance model has difficulty explaining this specific phenomenon. 
According to such a model, an overextension would occur whenever the 
basketball problem retrieves a stored problem that just happened to utilize 
the law of large numbers. But such problems might be very diverse, with 
few if any sharing content with the basketball problem. Therefore, the only 
way to insure that the basketball problem retrieves a useful analog is to 
make the problematic assumption that retrieval is heavily based on the fea- 
tures correlated with the special structure of the ruIe. 
Criterion 4: Performance on a Rule-Governed Problem 
Deteriorates as a Function of the Number of Rules 
that are Required to Solve the Problem 
Rationale. Criterion 4 essentially holds that rules provide the appropriate 
unit for measuring the complexity of a problem. We can illustrate the crite- 
rion by considering problems that vary in the number of times they require 
application of the rule modus ponens. Even after equating for reading time, 
deciding that Argument 2 is valid presumably would take longer and be 
more error prone than deciding that Argument 1 is valid, because Argument 
2 requires one more application of modus ponens: 
1. If it’s raining, 1’11 take an umbrella 
It’s raining 
I’ll take an umbrella 
2. If it’s raining, 1’11 take an umbrella 
If I take an umbrella, I’ll lose it. 
It’s raining 
I’ll lose an umbrella 
(Our example might suggest that the phenomenon is an artifact of the 
premises being more complex in Argument 2 than in Argument 1; however, 
using correlational techniques, Rips, 1983, found no evidence that premise 
complexity per se affects the accuracy of reasoning.) 
The phenomenon of interest follows from our sketch of a rule model as 
long as one or more of the stages involved -coding, access, instantiation, 
and application-is executed less efficiently when it has to do n + 1 things 
than just n things. As many theorists have pointed out, this vulnerability to 
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sheer number may disappear with extended practice. In Anderson’s (1982) 
rule-based model of cognitive skills, for example, rules that are frequently 
applied in succession come to be “compiled” or chunked into a single rule; 
in such a case, performance would be rule-based yet fail to meet Criterion 4. 
The diagnosticity of this criterion is further reduced by the fact that the 
basic phenomenon involved seems roughly compatible with an instance 
modeI: What needs to be assumed is that problems that supposedly require 
more rules are really just problems that generally have fewer or less accessi- 
ble analogues in memory. Again, though, we include the criterion because it 
may prove very diagnostic in certain cases, for example, in cases where there 
is a linear relation between the number of rules that a problem requires and 
the reaction time needed to solve the problem. Also, the criterion has a 
history of use in evaluating rule-based hypotheses. For example, in psycho- 
Iinguistics, it figured centrally in testing the hypothesis that the complexity 
of a sentence was an increasing function of the number of transformational 
rules needed to derive the surface form of the sentence (Miller, 1962). 
Evidence About Modus Ponens. We know of no direct application of 
Criterion 4 like our double modus ponens example. Rather than being ap- 
plied to a single rule used a varying number of times, the criterion has been 
applied to a set of rules. Osherson (1975), Rips (1983), and Braine, Reiser, 
and Rumain (1984) all applied the criterion to proposed sets of logical rules 
that include modus ponens along with a dozen or so other rules from propo- 
sitional logic (such sets are capable of determining the validity of most argu- 
ments in propositional logic and hence, constitute relatively complete theories 
of people’s logical capabilities). The work of these investigators shows that 
there is a monotonic relation-and sometimes a linear one-between the 
number of rules needed to determine whether an argument is valid and the 
reaction time and accuracy of the final response. Insofar as modus ponens 
is a rule in the systems of all three investigators, there is indirect evidence 
for the use of modus ponens. 
Criterion 5: Performance on a Rule-Based Item is Facilitated 
When Preceded by Another Item Based on the Same Rule 
(Application of a Rule Primes Its Subsequent Use) 
Rationale. The rationale for this criterion is that, once used, a mental 
structure remains active for a brief time period and during this period the 
structure is more accessible than usual. In terms of our rule model, the 
access stage has been facilitated. (Anderson, 1982, made a similar assump- 
tion relating recency of rule use to ease of subsequent access.) Our sketch of 
an instance model would be able to account for the phenomenon to the ex- 
tent that successively presented rule-based items are also similar in content; 
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but as we will see, the plausibilty of this account depends on the specific 
findings involved. 
Evidence About Contractual Rules. As far as we know, the priming 
criterion has been applied only to contractual rules. In a study we performed 
recently (Langston, Nisbett, & Smith, 1991), subjects were presented on 
each trial with a different version of the four-card problem. Sometimes the 
version conformed to a permission rule (v precondition P is satisfied, 
action A can be taken), whereas other times it conformed to an obligation 
rule (uprecondition P issatisfied, action A must be taken). It was therefore 
possible to have successive trials in which the permission rule would be used 
twice, as illustrated in Argument 3 below, as well as successive trials in 
which the permission rule is used only once, as in Argument 4: 
3a. If a journalist has a press pass, she can cross a police line 
b. If a journalist gets a statement on the record, she can quote her source 
4a. If a journalist is a member of the union, she must pay dues 
b. If a journalist gets a statement on the record, she can quote her source 
Subjects made more correct responses in testing the rule in 3b than in 4b. 
The same permission rule was involved in both cases, but was primed onIy 
in 3b. (Repetition of the rule was confounded with repetition of the word 
“can,” but as we will see later, repetition of “can” alone has no effect.) 
It might seem that an instance model can readily explain these results. All 
that need be hypothesized is that subjects use the previous item as an analog 
for the current problem they are working.on. This would lead to a correct 
response for 3b and an incorrect one for 4b. This predicts, however, that 
errors on permission (obligation) problems would be correct responses, 
had the problems in fact been obligation (permission) problems. This pre- 
diction was not supported. There is, however, another aspect of the Langston 
et al. results that does suggest a role for instances. Langston et al. found 
priming effects only for items similar in content (as in 3). If the priming 
item shared little content with the target item, there was no improvement 
either in accuracy or latency (even though the word “can” was repeated). 
Nisbett (1991) found a similar failure of semantically unrelated items to 
produce priming of the law of large numbers in an untimed problem-solving 
situation. The fact that rule-priming depends on the similarity of the prime 
and target items suggests that both rules and instances may be involved in 
these tasks (hence, the criterion is not very diagnostic). We return to this 
issue in the final section. 
Criterion 6: A Verbal Protocol May Mention a Rule 
or Its Components 
Rationale. The rationale for this criterion is based on the standard inter- 
pretation of protocol analysis. Presumably, the protocol is a direct reflection 
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of what is active in the subject’s short-term or working memory (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984, and if a particular rule has been in working memory, then it 
may have been recently used. Or, to put it in terms of our sketch of a rule 
model, the products of the access, instantiation, or application stages may 
reside (perhaps only briefly) in working memory, which makes them acces- 
sible to report. There is no reason to expect an instance model to yield such 
reports. However, the protocol criterion is still of limited diagnosticity, 
given that there are cases of apparent rule following in which the rules can- 
not be reported (namely, in language), as well as cases of reported rules for 
tasks for which there is independent evidence that the rules were not followed 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Evidence About Modus Ponens. In Rips’ (1983) studies of deductive 
reasoning, he had subjects talk aloud while solving some problems. Rips 
found some clear parallels between the successive statements in a protocol 
and the sequence of propositional rules needed to solve the problem. Because 
one of these rules is modus ponens, these findings provide some indirect 
evidence for modus ponens meeting our protocol criterion. Similarly, Galotti, 
Baron, and Sabini (1986) collected verbal protocols while subjects tried to 
generate conclusions to syllogistic arguments. They concluded that the pro- 
tocols “provide direct evidence of the existence of deduction rules” (p. 19; 
the protocols also provide evidence of the existence of nonrule-like entities). 
Evidence About the Law of Large iVumbers. In Piaget and Inhelder’s 
(195 l/1975) classic study of the child’s conception of chance, they found 
.surprisingly clear paraphrases of the law of large numbers even from chil- 
dren aged 10 to 12. For example, in one situation a child is presented with a 
pointer that could stop on one of eight different colored locations, and is 
asked if there is more likely to be an equal number of stops on each color if 
the pointer is spun 15 times or 800 times. One child replied: 
It will be more regular with 800 because that’s larger. For a small number [of 
chances] [the outcome] changes each time and it depends on the number of 
times, but with a larger number of tries it has more chances of being more 
regular. (p. 89) 
Although this protocol provides some prima facie evidence for the use of 
the law of large numbers, a skeptic could easily claim that the reasoning 
revealed in the protocol is not what is actually mediating the problem solv- 
ing, and that people are merely inventing plausible stories to explain their 
behavior. What is needed to strengthen protocol evidence is a linking of it to 
performance measures. This is exactly what Nisbett and his colleagues have 
done. They found evidence that some people can articulate an abstract ver- 
sion of the law of large numbers, and that those who invoke it in justifica- 
tion of their answers to problems covered by the rule are in fact more likely 
to give correct answers. For example, in the isolated-island problem discussed 
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earlier, Nisbett et al. (1983) found that subjects often justified their willing- 
ness to make strong generalizations from a single case on the basis of 
assumptions about low variability and the resulting generalizability even 
from small samples. Subjects who explicitly gave such justifications were 
more likely to reason in accordance with the law of large numbers in general. 
Similarly, Jepson, Krantz and Nisbett (1983), and Fong et al. (1986) found 
that some subjects often articulated quite general versions of the rule in 
justifying answers to specific problems. For example, it was common for 
subjects to say things like, “The more examples you have, the better the 
conclusion you can draw.” Subjects who provided such articulations of the 
rule gave answers in accordance with the rule on a higher proportion of 
problems than did other subjects. 
Criterion 7: Performance on a Specific Rule-Based Problem 
Is Improved by Training on an Abstract Version of the Rule 
Rationale. The idea behind this criterion is that, because rule following is 
presumably what underlies performance on specific problems, practice on 
an abstract version of the rule (abstract in all senses we have considered) can 
improve performance on specific problems. In part, this should be true 
because training improves the rule- clarifies it, renders it more precise, and 
even changes its nature so as to make it more valid. From the perspective of 
our sketch of a rule model, practice on the rule in the abstract could also 
benefit performance by increasing the accessibility of the rule and perhaps 
also by facilitating the application of the rule. (To the extent that there were 
any examples in the training, there could be a facilitation of the instantia- 
tion stage as well.) From the perspective of an instance model, there is no 
obvious reason why such abstract training should have any effect on perfor- 
mance. Criterion 7 is therefore quite diagnostic. 
Evidence About Modus Tollens. Cheng et al. (1986) showed that training 
on rules from propositional logic, particularly modus tollens, did not lead 
to any improvement in performance on the four-card problem, specifically 
on selection of the choice corresponding to not Q. Training was of two 
forms. One form was an extensive laboratory session describing the rule and 
its application in Venn diagrams, truth tables, and an illustrative conditional 
statement. The other was an entire course in introductory logic that was 
centered on conditional logic, including the modus tollens rule. Criterion 
7, therefore, speaks against the use of modus tollens. (Abstract instruction 
also did not improve performance on the component of the four-card prob- 
lem that could be solved by application of modus ponens-selection of thep 
choice-but errors were sufficiently infrequent for ponens as to raise the 
possibility that there was a ceiling effect.) 
Evidence About Contractual Rules. In another study, Cheng et al. (1986) 
showed that comparable training on an abstract statement of the obligation 
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rule (“If precondition P is satisfied, action A must be taken”) did improve 
performance on the four-card problem. Training included drill in the check- 
ing procedures required to establish whether an obligation had been violated. 
Subjects were then asked to solve various versions of the four-card prob- 
lem, including versions to which an obligation interpretation could be ap- 
plied relatively easily, and arbitrary versions, such as the original Wason 
(1966) letter-and-number problem. We performed a reanalysis of the Cheng 
et al. results and found that the abstract training improved performance on 
those versions of the problem that could possibly be interpreted in obliga- 
tion terms (“If a house was built before 1979, then it has a fireplace”), and 
did not improve performance on problems for which an obligation interpre- 
tation seemed out of the question (such as the original Wason problem). 
We mentioned earlier that there is no obvious way in which an instance 
model can handle these results, but a nonobvious way might proceed as 
follows: Although the training involved only abstractions, subjects may 
have generated their own examples and subsequently retrieved those exam- 
ples during the four-card problem. What is wrong with this account is the 
usual set of difficulties. It seems most unlikely that the examples generated 
during training would have anything in common with the test items in the 
four-card problem, other than that they involved the notion of obligation. 
Again, the account rests on the ad hoc assumption that retrieval is pri- 
marily based on whatever is correlated with the special structure of the rule. 
Evidence About the Law of Large Numbers. Fong et al. (1986) showed 
that training on the law of large numbers affects the way people reason 
about a wide range of problems involving variability and uncertainty. They 
taught their subjects about the law of large numbers using purely abstract 
concepts and procedures. They defined for them the notions of sample, 
population, parameter, and variability, and showed by urn-problem demon- 
strations that larger samples are more likely to capture population param- 
eters than smaller samples. (These demonstrations, according to our sketch 
of a rule model, might have influenced the instantiation stage). Subjects were 
then asked to solve problems involving random generating devices, such as 
slot machines and lotteries, problems dealing with objective, quantifiable 
behavior, such as athletic and academic performances, and problems deal- 
ing with subjective judgments or social behaviors that are not normally 
coded in quantifiable terms. For example, one objective problem referred to 
earlier, required subjects to recognize that a basketball talent scout’s assess- 
ment of a potential player was based on a relatively small sample of behavior 
and might be mistaken. A subjective problem described a head nurse’s asser- 
tion that the most compassionate nurses, as judged from the first few days 
on the job, generally turn out to be no more concerned than the others, 
together with her attribution that this was probably the case because the 
most caring nurses build up a shell to protect themselves. A statistical answer 
to this problem recognized that a few days’ observation of nurses’ behavior 
24 SMITH, LANGSTON, AND NISBETT 
might not be a large enough sample for a stable estimate of an attribute like 
compassion. In line with a rule model, the abstract rule training produced a 
substantial increase in the number and quality of statistical answers, and did 
so to about the same degree for all three problem types. 
Further Evidence on the Law of Large Numbers and Other Rules. An ex- 
tensive set of studies by Nisbett and his colleagues on the effects of under- 
graduate and graduate training on reasoning is relevant to Criterion 7. They 
found that undergraduate training in psychology and the social sciences 
(Lehman & Nisbett, 1990) and graduate training in psychology (Lehman, 
Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988)‘markedly increased the degree to which students 
call on statistical principles (like the law of large numbers) in reasoning 
about everyday events involving uncertainty. Fong et al. (1986) found that a 
single course in statistics had a marked effect on the way students reason 
about sports. These results speak to Criterion 7 to the extent that statistics is 
typically taught as a highly abstract set of rules. 
Similarly, Morris et al. (1991) found that graduate training in psychology 
improved students’ abilities to apply causal rules to both unfamiliar and 
purely abstract material. In contrast, training in philosophy or chemistry 
had no effect on students’ causal reasoning, presumably because neither of 
these fields emphasizes the reasoning required for inferences about various 
types of causality. Again, the work is relevant to Criterion 7 to the extent 
that instruction about causality in psychology is quite formal and owes little 
to detailed work with concrete examples. 
Finally, work by Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett (1990; Larrick, Nisbett, & 
Morgan, in press) shows that formal training in cost-benefit rules affects 
people’s reasoning about an indefinitely large number of problems involving 
choice in everyday life. 
Criterion 8: Performance on ProbIems in a Particular Domain 
is Improved as Much by Training on Problems Outside the Domain 
as on Problems Within it, as Long as the Problems are Based 
on the Same Rule 
Rationale. If a major product of training is an abstract rule that is as 
applicable to problems from one domain as to those from another, then 
subjects taught how to use the rule in a given content domain should readily 
transfer what they have learned to other domains. To put it in terms of our 
sketch of a rule model: The major products of training are increases in the 
accessibility of the rule and in the consequent ease with which the rule can 
be instantiated and applied, and all of these benefits should readily transfer 
to domains other than those of the training problems. The upshot is that 
domain-specificity effects of training might be relatively slight. To the ex- 
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tent such effects are slight, instance models are embarrassed because they 
naturally predict better performance for test problems that resemble train- 
ing ones. Hence, Criterion 8 is very diagnostic of rule following. 
Evidence About the Law of Large Numbers. This criterion has thus far 
been applied only to the law of large numbers. Fong et al. (1986) trained 
subjects in one of three domains: random generating devices, objectively 
measurable abilities and achievements, or subjective judgments. Then sub- 
jects worked on test problems from all three domains. Performance on the 
test problems- as measured by the frequency of mention of statistical con- 
cepts and laws, and by the quality of the answers-was improved by the 
training. Most importantly, the degree of improvement for problems in the 
untrained domains was as great as for problems in the trained domain. For 
example, training on probabilistic device problems improved performance 
on objective and subjective test problems as much as it did for probabilistic 
device test problems. 
The domains employed by Fong et al. (1986) are very broad ones, leaving 
open the possibility that two problems from the same domain shared very 
little in the way of content, perhaps little more, in fact, than two problems 
from different domains. But this possibility is ruled out by a more recent 
study. Fong and Nisbett (1991) examined two different objective attribute 
domains: athletic contests and ability tests. They taught some of their sub- 
jects to apply the law of large numbers to one domain, and some to apply 
this rule to the other domain. When subjects were tested immediately, 
again, there was no effect at all of training domain on performance. This is 
strong evidence for rule following. When subjects were tested after 2 weeks, 
however, there was some effect of domain on performance, although there 
was still a significant training effect across domains as well. The domain- 
specificity effect after a delay should probably not be attributed too quickly 
to retrieval of examples from memory. Performance at the later testing time 
was unrelated to the ability to recall details of examples, but was related to 
the ability to recall the abstract rule. The latter findings suggest that, during 
training, subjects may have learned how to code the elements of a given do- 
main in terms of the rule, which could result in domain-specific coding and 
access processes. Such processes would lead to an advantage for problems 
in the trained domain after a delay when access was more problematic. 
It is worth emphasizing that the utter lack of domain-specificity effects, 
when testing takes place immediately, is particularly problematic for an 
instance model. Such a model requires that the more similar the content of 
the test and training problems, the more likely a test problem will retrieve a 
training problem, which will culminate in better performance when the test 
and training problems are from the same domain. The only way to salvage 
the model is to posit that retrieval is heavily based on only those features 
correlated with the special structure of the rule. Yet, it is not even clear that 
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there are any content features of a problem that are correlated with the law 
of large numbers. As usual, then, the assumption in question seems ad hoc, 
and likely wrong. 
A Possible Ninth Criterion 
Criterion 8 says that after training, performance on a rule-governed item is 
unaffected by its similarity to items encountered during training. A general- 
ization of this phenomenon yields a new criterion: Performance on a ruie- 
governed item is unaffected by its degree of similarity to previously en- 
countered items. This is a very diagnostic criterion, because the hallmark of 
instance models is their sensitivity to similar items stored in memory. 
We have not included the preceding as one of our criteria because we 
have not been able to find a study in which it has been successfully used to 
bolster the case for abstract rules in reasoning. Perhaps one reason the pro- 
posed similarity criterion has not been used is that it is exceptionally sensi- 
tive to any use of instances whatsoever. But we may be being too pessimistic 
here, because there are psycholinguistic studies where the proposed simi- 
larity criterion has been met, thereby providing very strong evidence for rule 
use. Consider again research on phonological rules showing that people can 
supply the plurals of nonsense nouns. The fact ‘that people can as readily 
supply the plural for “zamph” as for “zig’‘-even though “zamph” does 
not rhyme with any English word and hence is not very similar to any known 
instance -is an indication that performance is unaffected by the similarity 
of the test item to previous instances (Pinker & Prince, 1988). A comparable 
story holds for the rule for forming the past tense of regular verbs. Young 
children are no more likely to produce the correct past tense for regular 
verbs that are similar to many other regular verbs, than they are to produce 
the correct past tense for regular verbs that are similar to few other regular 
verbs (Marcus et al., 1990). Perhaps this kind of evidence can be obtained 
with abstract reasoning rules. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this final section, we begin by summarizing our results, and then take up 
a number of outstanding issues. One such issue concerns reasoning mecha- 
nisms that involve both rules and instances; a second issue concerns the 
possibility of a type of rule following other than the explicit sort we have 
considered thus far; the final issue deals with the implications of our find- 
ings and arguments for connectionist models of reasoning. 
Summary 
Throughout most of this article we have been concerned with two inter- 
related matters: possible criteria for rule following and possible rules that 
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are followed. Let US first summarize our progress regarding the possible 
criteria, then turn to what we have found out about rules. 
Criteria. We have presented and defended a set of criteria for establishing 
whether or not a rule is used for solving a given problem. Satisfaction of the 
less diagnostic of these criteria- those concerned with overextension, num- 
ber of rules, priming, and protocols-adds something to the case that a 
given rule is used for solving a given problem. Satisfaction of the more 
diagnostic criteria-those concerned with familiarity, abstractness, abstract 
training effects, and ‘domain independence in training-adds even more to 
the case for rule following. And satisfaction of most or all of these criteria 
adds greatly to the case for rule following. These criteria can serve to put the 
debate between abstraction-based and instance-based reasoning into clearer 
perspective. 
Table 1 presents each of the eight criteria crossed with the five different 
rule systems we have examined in detail; broken lines indicate that the rule 
system failed the criterion of interest. Table 1 makes it easy to see a pair of 
points concerning the criteria. One is that most of the criteria have been 
underused. It is clear that application of the criteria has been relatively hap- 
hazard, with many tests of a particular criterion for some rules and only one 
or two tests of a smattering of the other criteria. We suspect that the criteria 
used have been chosen relatively arbitrarily, and that investigators often 
have tested less powerful criteria than they might have, simply because they 
were not aware of the existence of other, more powerful ones. Our overview 
of criteria and the rationales behind them should help to organize and direct 
research on the use of rules. 
The other point about the criteria that is readily apparent from Table 1 is 
that the criteria converge. That is, if a rule passes one criterion it generally 
passes any other criterion that has been applied. Conversely, if a rule fails 
one criterion it generally fails other criteria that have been applied. We have 
only one case of this convergence of failures-modus tollens-because our 
main concern has been with abstract rules that are likely to be in people’s 
repertoires. If we turn our attention to unnatural rules, which are unlikely 
to be in people’s repertoires, we should see other failures to satisfy the 
criteria. Consider, for example, work by Ross (1987), in which people are 
taught relatively unnatural rules from probability theory, such as the rule 
that specifies the expected number of trials to wait for a particular probabilis- 
tic event to occur (the “waiting time” rule). Ross observed a strong viola- 
tion of our domain-independence-of-training criterion, that is, performance 
on a test problem markedly depended on its similarity to a training problem. 
Recent results by Allen and Brooks (1991), who taught subjects artificial 
rules, makes exactly the same point. These failures of unnatural rules to 
pass the criterion attest to the validity of the criteria. 
Three qualifications of the criteria are also worth mentioning. First, for 
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or-none fashion, but probably it would be more useful to treat each criterion 
in a relative fashion. We can illustrate this point with Criterion 1, perfor- 
mance on rule-governed items is as accurate with unfamiliar as familiar 
items. Taking the criterion literally, there is evidence for rule-following only 
when there is absolutely no difference between unfamiliar and familiar 
items. But surely the phenomenon that underlies the criterion admits of 
degrees, perhaps because of moment-to-moment variations in whether an 
individual uses a rule. Given this, Criterion 1 is better stated as the less the 
difference in performance between unfamiliar and familiar rule-governed 
items, the greater the use of rules. Similar remarks apply to Criterion 2 
(good performance on abstract items), Criterion 7 (abstract training effects), 
and Criterion 8 (domain independence of training). It is noteworthy that ac- 
tual uses of these criteria tend to employ the relative interpretation (see, 
e.g., the Allen and Brooks, 1991, use of domain-independence-of-training 
effects). 
A second quahfication of the criteria stems from the fact that their diag- 
nosticity has been measured in terms of how difficult they are to explain by 
models based on stored instances. But Johnson-Laird (1983) has cham- 
pioned a theoretical approach which holds that people reason by generating 
novel instances (in his terms, “reasoning by means of mental models”). To 
illustrate, suppose someone is told, “If gork then flum.” They would repre- 
sent this conditional in terms of the following sort of mental model: 
gorkl= flum 1 
gork2 = flum 2 
(flum 3). 
The equal sign indicates that the same instance is involved, and the paren- 
theses indicates that the instance is optional. If now told there exists a gork, 
one can use this mental model to conclude there also exists a flum, and in 
this way implement modus ponens. What is important about this for our pur- 
poses is that a theory based on such novel instances seems more compatible 
with our criteria than theories based on stored instances. For example, there 
is no obvious reason why one cannot construct a mental model as readily 
for an unfamiliar item as for a familiar one, or as readily for an abstract 
item as a concrete one. 
The final qualification is simply that the application of our criteria does 
not provide as definitive data on the rule-versus-instance issue as does a 
contrast of detailed models. Our criteria are needed mainly in situations 
where detailed reasoning models have not been developed: the usual case as 
far as we can tell. (An exception is Nosofsky, Clark, and Shin, 1989, who 
did contrast detailed rule and instance models, but who considered rules 
that are not abstract by our definitions.) Our criteria also provide useful 
constraints in developing detailed rule models, for example, any rule model 
that is concerned only with abstract rules ought to produce comparable per- 
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formance for unfamiliar and familiar items, for abstract and concrete 
items, and so on. 
Rules. Table 1 also tells us about what rules are followed. We believe that 
the applications of the criteria to date serve to establish that people make 
use of a number of abstract rules in solving problems of a sort that occur 
frequently in everyday life. In particular, there is substantial evidence for at 
least three sorts of rule systems. 
For modus ponens, there is evidence that people: (a) perform as well- 
that is, make inferences in accordance with the rule-on unfamiliar as on 
familiar material; (b) perform as well on abstract as on concrete material; 
(c) perform better if they must invoke the rule fewer rather than more times; 
and (d) sometimes provide protocols suggesting that they have used the rule. 
(On the other hand, there is some evidence that the rule cannot be trained by 
abstract techniques, but this evidence may merely indicate that the rule is 
already asymptotic.) 
For contractual rules, namely permission and obligation rules, there 
is evidence that people: (a) perform as well on unfamiliar as on familiar 
material; (b) perform as well on abstract as on concrete material; (c) show 
priming effects of the rule, at least within a content domain; and (d) bene- 
fit from training in their ability to apply the rule to any material that can 
plausibly be interpreted in terms of it. There is also some evidence of a com- 
parable kind for formally similar causal rules. 
For the system of statistical rules under the rubric of the law of large 
numbers, it has been shown that people: (a) perform well with unfamiliar 
material; (b) overextend the rule early in training; (c) often mention the rule 
in relatively abstract form in justification of their answers for particular 
problems; (d) improve in their ability to apply the rule across a wide number 
of domains by purely abstract training on the rule; and (e) improve their 
performance on problems outside the domain of training as much as on 
problems within it. 
The demonstrations that people follow modus ponens and the law of 
large numbers are of particular interest in view of the fact that these two 
rules are normative and promote optimal inferential performance. Evidence 
for people following certain abstract inferential rules thus amounts to evi- 
dence for people manifesting aspects of rationality. Although there is less 
data about causal rules, what evidence there is suggests that people also 
follow these rules (see Table l), which again are normative. And there is 
some recent evidence for the use of still another set of normative rules, 
those governing economic choices (La&k et al., 1990; in press). 
In contrast to the positive evidence summarized before, there are three 
lines of negative evidence on the question of whether people use modus 
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tollens. It has been shown that people perform poorly: (a) with unfamiliar 
items; (b) with abstract items; and (c) even after formal training in the rule. 
We therefore believe that the consensus among students of the problem that 
most people do not use modus tollens is justified in terms of the criteria 
studied to date. This demonstration indicates that application of our criteria 
can cut both ways: Negative evidence relating to the criteria can cast sub- 
stantial doubt on the use of a rule, just as positive evidence can buttress the 
case for its use. 
Of course modus ponens, modus tollens, contractual rules, and the law 
of large numbers are just a handful of the many possible seemingly natural 
rules that people may follow in reasoning about everyday problems. There 
are, for example, numerous rules in propositional logic other than ponens 
and tollens that have been proposed as psychologically real (see, for instance, 
Braine et al., 1984). One such rule is and-introduction, which states -Ifp is 
the case and if q is the case then p and q is the case. The obvious question is: 
How does and-introduction stack up against our eight criteria? The same 
question applies to other rules from propositional logic, and to rules that 
have figured in Piagetian-type research (including transitivity, commuta- 
tivity, and associativity), as well as to rules that come from other bodies of 
work. The point is that all we have done in this article is sample a rule or 
two from a few major branches of reasoning-deduction, statistics, and 
causality- and there are other rules of interest in these and other branches 
of reasoning. 
A final point to note about the evidence for rules is that the work to date 
shows not merely that people can follow rules when instructed to do so in 
artificial problem-solving situations, but that they do follow quite abstract 
inferential rules when solving ordinary, everyday problems. For example, in 
their studies of the law of large numbers, Fong et al. (198.6) performed not 
merely laboratory experiments, but field studies in which subjects did not 
even know they were being tested. In one study, male subjects were called in 
the context of an alleged “survey on sports opinions.” Subjects were en- 
rolled in introductory statistics courses and were called either at the begin- 
ning of the course or at the end. After being asked a few questions about 
NBA salaries and NCAA rules, it was pointed out to them that although 
many batters often finish the first 2 weeks of the baseball season with aver- 
ages of .450 or higher, no one has ever finished the season with such an 
average. They were asked why they thought this was the case. Most subjects 
responded with causal hypotheses such as, “the pitchers make the necessary 
adjustments.” Some, however, responded with statistical answers such as, 
“there are not many at-bats in 2 weeks, so unusually high (or low) averages 
would be more likely; over the long haul nobody is really that good.” There 
were twice as many statistical answers from subjects tested at the end of the 
term as from subjects tested at the beginning. 
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Similarly, Larrick et al. (1991) found that subjects who were taught cost- 
benefit rules came to apply them in all sorts of life contexts, from consumer 
decisions about whether to finish a bad meal or bad movie, to professional 
decisions about whether to pursue a line of work that was turning out to be 
disappointing, to hypothetical questions about institutional policy and 
international relations. 
Thus, the work reviewed here establishes not merely that people can 
follow abstract rules self-consciously in appropriate educational, experi- 
mental, or professional settings, but that such rules play at least a limited 
role in ordinary inference. 
Combining Rule and Instance Mechanisms 
Our review indicates that pure instance models of reasoning and problem 
solving are not viable. There is too much evidence, stemming from the 
application of too many criteria, indicating that people use abstract rules in 
reasoning. On the other hand, there is also abundant evidence that reason- 
ing and problem solving often proceed via the retrieval of instances (e.g., 
Allen dc Brooks, 1991; Kaiser, Jonides, & Alexander, 1986; Medin & Ross, 
1989; Ross, 1987). At a minimum, then, we need to posit two qualitatively 
different mechanisms of reasoning. Whereas some situations may involve 
only one of the mechanisms, others may involve both. 
In addition to pure-rtile and pure-instance mechanisms, hybrid mecha- 
nisms may be needed as well. In particular, hybrid mechanisms may be 
needed to account for the situations noted earlier in which people process 
instances deeply enough to encode some information about the relevant 
abstraction as well as about the concrete aspects of the instance. These are 
the situations that are the concern of most case-based reasoning models 
(e.g., Hammond et al., 1991; Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1982). In such situa- 
tions, people have essentially encoded both an instance and a rule, so a 
hybrid mechanism must specify how the two representational aspects are 
connected. We consider two possibilities. 
One possibility is that a retrieved instance provides access to a rule. That 
is, when an item is presented, it first accesses similar instances from memory 
that the reasoner can use to access a rule. Then, the final stages of rule pro- 
cessing-instantiation and application- ensue, though the instance may serve 
as a guide for these two stages. We can illustrate this mechanism with the 
drinking version of the four-card problem. When presented the problem, 
presumably a subject uses this item to retrieve from memory an episode of a 
drinking event; this representation may contain the information that people 
below the drinking age are in violation of the law, and the concept of viola- 
tion may be used to access the permission rule; from here on, processing 
would continue as specified in our sketch of a rule model except that the 
retrieved instance can be used to guide the instantiation and application 
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stages. This hybrid process, which we will refer to as instance&de mecha- 
nism, captures the intuition that we often understand an abstract rule in 
turns of a specific example. 
The other possibility is that a rule provides access to a relevant instance 
(a rule-instance mechanism). That is, when an item is presented it is coded 
abstractly, and this abstraction accesses the appropriate rule (these are the 
first two stages of our sketch of a rule model). The rule then provides access 
to some typical examples, and these instances control further processing. 
Again, we can illustrate with the drinking version of the four-card problem. 
When presented the problem, a subject codes the item in terms of per- 
mission, and uses this code to access the permission rules. Associated with 
these rules are typical examples of permission situations, and one or more 
of these instances is used as an analogue for the present problem (that is, it 
is used for the mapping stage). 
A few comments are in order about these mechanisms. Note that we are 
not proposing the two hybrid mechanisms as alternatives to the two pure 
mechanisms (rule and instance). Rather, we suspect that all four mechanisms 
can be used, albeit with different situations recruiting different mechanisms. 
(The experimental situations we reviewed in this article likely involved either 
the pure-rule or the rule-instance mechamisn.) In situations where more 
than one mechanism is involved, presumably the processes operate simulta- 
neously and independently of one another. Thus, the final answer may be 
determined by a kind of “horse race” between the operative mechanisms, 
with the mechanism that finishes first determining the final judgment. 
Note further that our hybrid mechanisms allow room for instance-type 
effects should they occur. Consider again Criterion 1, that novel rule-based 
items are treated as accurately as familiar ones. The available evidence is 
consistent with this criterion, but the criterion deals only with accuracy. 
Perhaps if one were to measure reaction times, familiar rule-based items 
might be processed faster than novel ones. Such a result could be handled 
easily by our instance-rule mechanism. Familiar items should be faster in 
accessing a relevant instance because familiar items are themselves likely to 
be instances. In addition, we have already seen an indication of instance 
effects even for accuracy. Such an effect appeared in connection with Cri- 
terion 5, that application of a rule primes its subsequent use. Recall. that in 
the four-card problem, Langston et al. (1991) found evidence for priming of 
contractual rules only when the prime and target were similar in content. 
This pattern of results also fits nicely with the instance-rule mechanism. 
Only when the target and prime are similar in content does the target retrieve 
the prime instance, and only when the prime is retrieved does one gain access 
to the relevant rule. Thus, instance-type effects do not imply that rules were 
not involved. 
Finally, another case of instance-type effects during rule use is provided 
by Ross (1987). Ross trained subjects on the waiting-time rule of probability 
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theory and then had them solve new test problems with the rule present. 
Even though the rule was present, subjects appeared to rely on training 
problems when determining how to instantiate the rule. These results indi- 
cate that instances are used not just to access a rule but also to help instan- 
tiate it, as in the instance-rule mechanism. (These results, however, may 
depend in part on the fact that the rule involved was not a natural one). 
In short, the dichotomy between pure rules and pure instances is too 
simple. Hybrid mechanisms seem plausible, particularly in light of the role 
they play in current versions of case-based reasoning. 
Two Kinds of Rule Following 
Until now we have acted as if explicit rule following is the only kind of rule 
following. But a critical observation suggests the need to consider a second- 
kind. The observation (due to Douglas Medin, personal communication, 
April 1991) is that, when finguistic rules are stacked up against our eight 
criteria they seem to consistently fail three of them, namely verbal proto- 
cols, abstract training effects, and context independence in training. That 
is, people are notoriously unable to verbalize the linguistic rules they pur- 
portedly use, and they fail to benefit much from explicit (school) instruc- 
tions on these rules. If linguistic rules meet only five of our criteria whereas 
reasoning rules (generally) meet all eight, perhaps the kind of rule followed 
involved in language is different from that involved in reasoning. 
Presumably there is a kind of rule following that is implicit rather than 
explicit; that is, the rule is never explicitly represented, which accounts for 
why it can neither be reported nor affected by explicit instruction. The rule 
might be implemented in the hardware, and is essentially a description of 
how some built-in processor works (see Pinker & Prince, 1988, Section 8.2). 
Implicit rules are close to what we earlier characterized as operating princi- 
ples of a system, and rules like this may be part of our basic cognitive archi- 
tecture. Such notions fit nicely with Pylyshyn’s (1984) concept of cognitive 
penetrability. His basic idea is that anything that is part of the fixed cogni- 
tive architecture cannot be altered (penetrated) by goals, context, or instruc- 
tion. If some linguistic rules are part of our basic architecture, they should 
not be affected by instruction, which means that our two instructional criteria 
should fail, as they in fact do. (The seeming imperviousness of modus ponens 
to instruction leaves open the possibility that this rule too may be repre- 
sented implicitly.) 
Implications for Connectionist Models 
Although we know of no limit, in principle, on the ability of connectionist 
models to code abstractions, the evidence we have presented for abstract 
rules does not fit well with the connectionist program. 
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For one thing, what seems to be the most straightforward account of 
much of the evidence involves concepts that are anathema to connection- 
ism. The account we have in mind is that of explicit ruIe following: The rule 
and input Fe mentally represented explicitly, and application of the rule to 
the input involves an inspection of the input to determine whether the ante- 
cedent of the rule has been satisfied. Notions of explicit data strucfures and 
inspection of explicit structures simply lie outside the ontology of connection- 
ism. Of course, connectionists may be able to develop aIternative accounts 
of the data, but there is no reason to believe the resulting connection& 
modeIs will be as parsimonious as the sort of rule-based model we advocate. 
This is particularly the case given that the abstract rules that have to be 
modeled all involve variable bindings, which remains a difficult issue in 
connectionist work (for discussion, see Holyoak, 1991). In short, rule-based 
models provide a simple account of the data, and no comparable connec- 
tionist alternatives are thus far in sight. 
In constructing alternative models of the evidence, connectionists face 
another difficulty. The evidence indicates that people can use two qualita- 
tively different mechanisms in reasoning, which we have termed “rules” 
and “instances,” whereas connectionist models endorse a uniform represen- 
tation. Connectionist models can either blur the rule-instance distinction, in 
which case they are simpIy failing to capture a major generalization about 
human cognition, or they can somehow mark the distinction, in which case 
they may be merely implementing a rule-based model in a connectionist net. 
We say “merely” because it is not cIear that such an implementation will 
yield any new important insights about reasoning. 
The preceding points have been programmatic, but the remaining one is 
more substantive. According to rule models, the rationale for some rules 
hinges on a constituency relation-like that which holds between up then q 
and p-but most current connectionist models lack true constituency rela- 
tions. In discussing this issue, we need to keep separate focalist connectionist 
models, in which a concept can be represented by a single node, and dis- 
tributed modeIs, in which a concept is represented by a set of nodes. We 
consider localist models first. 
To understand the constituency issue, consider modus ponens. Given Up 
then q andp, the fact that the latter is a constituent of the former is part of 
why we can conclude q. To take an even simpler example, consider again 
and-introduction: up is the case and if q is the case then p and q is Ihe case. 
Here, it is clear that the basis of the rule is a constituency relation; the rule 
essentially states, if each of its constituents is the case, then a conjunction is 
the case. In contrast, localist connectionist models lack constituency rela- 
tions, so such relations can never serve as the bases for ruIes. 
The reason localist connectionist models lack constituency relations is 
that their nodes (their representations) lack any internal structure, including 
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a part-whole structure. In a localist model for and-introduction, for exam- 
ple, there might be separate nodes for p, q, and p and q, which are con- 
nected in such a way that whenever the nodes forp and q are both activated, 
the node for p and q is activated. Importantly, the node for p and q has no 
internal structure, and in no sense contains the node for p or that for q. 
Hence, the relation between the p and q nodes on the one hand, and the p 
and q node on the other, is strictly causal (as opposed to constituency). That 
is, activation of p and q causes activation ofp and q in exactly the same way 
that activation of a node forfire might cause activation of a node for smoke. 
Although we know of no data on whether constituency relations are per- 
ceived as the bases of some rules, our intuitions suggest they are, which 
favors the rule account. (For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Fodor 
and Pylyshyn, 1988). 
Distributed connectionist models seem better able to accommodate con- 
stituency relations because they at least have.a part-whole structure. Thus, 
ifp and q is represented by a set of nodes, then some part of that set can, in 
principle, representp and another part q. However, current distributed con- 
nectionist models still have trouble capturing constituent structure, as Fodor 
and McLaughlin (1990) pointed out. The latter authors take up a proposal 
of Smolensky’s (1988), in which a concept (rule) is represented in terms of a 
vector whose components represent the activity levels of the members of the 
relevant set of nodes. According to Smolensky, vector a is a constituent of 
vector b if there exists a third vector-call it x-such that a +x = b; a is a 
part of b because b is derivable from a( +x). But this proposal permits the 
possibility that b may be activated without a being activated. In the case of 
and-introduction, this means that p and q could be activated without p 
being activated. Such a thing should be impossible ifp is a true constituent 
of p and q. Again, to the extent some rules are based on constituent struc- 
ture, the rule account is favored over current connectionist rivals. 
None of this is to suggest that connectionist models do not have an im- 
portant role to play-they have been very successful in capturing aspects of 
perception, memory, and categorization, for example-but rather to suggest 
that some aspects of reasoning may be inherently rule based, and hence, not 
naturally captured by connectionist models. Of course, a rule-based model, 
unlike a connectionist one, .willUnot look like a biological model. Thus, to 
pursue rule-based models of reasoning is to give up the wish that all mental 
phenomena be expressive of biological phenomena rather than merely emer- 
gent on them. It has always been hard to make the leap from mere neural 
connections to abstract rules that seem metaphorically to sit astride the hus- 
tle and bustle of biological activity in the brain, altering and managing the 
results of such activity, and being modified by the mere words of outsiders 
and the ministrations of educators. We do not pretend to be able to make 
the leap from the known facts of the behavior of the nervous system to a 
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plausible, emergent set of highly modifiable abstract rules. We claim merely 
that a correct theory of mind may have to do so. 
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